With the rapid development of quantum key distribution (QKD) technology, more various types of QKD protocols are being proposed. Considering the variety of QKD protocols, the exclusivity of quantum channels, the limitation of key generation capability, and the necessity of credibility control, it is a crucial task to explore the cost-effective construction of hybrid QKD networks. In this paper, a hybrid QKD network composed of multiple types of QKD protocols based on trustedrelays is considered from the perspective of topology, and then an analytical model for optimizing the deployment of QKD devices and trusted-relays is proposed to provide secure communication services for a large scale and a wide range of users at the minimum cost. The effectiveness and universality of this proposed analytical model are verified by plentiful simulation results.
Based on the previous research, optical-switch, quantumrelay, and trusted-relay are three commonly used approaches to construct a QKD network. Due to the scale limitation of opticalswitches and the technology immaturity of quantum-relays, the use of trusted-relays is the most practical approach at present [4] . However, in the application of the trusted-relay approach, encrypted data is forwarded in plaintext at the relay nodes [2] . In order to ensure the security of data transmission, the credibility of relay nodes must be controlled. Therefore, credibility control cost for trusted-relays, which is neglected by the existing research, should be taken as an important component of the construction cost for trusted-relay based QKD networks.
In addition, with the continuous attention of researchers in the field of QKD technology, increasing types of QKD protocols can be used to construct a QKD network. There are significant differences in key generation capability, preparation cost and fiber dependency between different types of QKD protocols. For example, a BB84-QKD device [5] has a relatively high key generation capability, but the required single-photon detectors are expensive. By contrast, a GG02-QKD device [6] does not require single photon detector, which reduces the preparation cost, but its key generation capability is lower, especially in the case of long distance. Different from the point-to-point mode of the former two types of devices, MDI-QKD [7] and TF-QKD [8] devices can use untrusted-relays to network, but their key generation capabilities are lower than the former two. Therefore, it's worth speculating that a hybrid network can achieve significant savings by integrating and deploying multiple types QKD devices.
The necessity of credibility control and the variety of QKD protocols, coupled with several intrinsic characteristics of QKD devices, such as the exclusivity of quantum channels and the limitation of key generation capabilities, make the minimum cost calculation of the hybrid QKD network a complex task. In the literature [9] and [10] , cost minimization models for QKD networks have been designed under the conditions of link segmentation and and multi-path routing respectively. However, it is difficult to build relay nodes according to the optimal working distance calculated by literature [9] . In addition, MDI-QKD protocol, TF-QKD protocol, and other QKD protocols that rely on two solid fibers have not been studied in the above analysis models. Furthermore, the reliability control cost has also not been considered.
Therefore, to study the hybrid QKD networks, this paper proposes a novel classification method. According to the distinction on fiber dependency, various QKD protocols are divided into the client-to-client (C2C-QKD) protocol which relies on one optical fiber, and the client-server-client (CSC-QKD) protocol which relies on two optical fibers. Furthermore, based on the proposed classification method and the introduction of credibility control cost, we present an analytical model for hybrid QKD networks to calculate the minimum cost, and finally obtain the optimal deployment of QKD devices and trusted-relays. Quantum state transmission is an essential step in the key distribution process of all types of QKD protocols. Because quantum state transmission relies on independent quantum channels, it will lead to a typical problem of quantum channel exclusiveness in QKD networks. To solve this problem, many researchers have put forward many technologies, such as wavelength-division-multiplexing and orthogonal-frequencydivision-multiplexing, to realize the multiplexing of quantum channels on original optical fibers, so as to provide quantum keys without changing original communication facilities. As a result, the dependence of QKD devices on existing optical fibers becomes a new problem. According to the distinction on fiber dependency, we propose a novel classification method that divides QKD protocols into C2C-QKD and CSC-QKD protocol, as shown in Fig. 1 
Fig. 1. The classification of QKD protocols
The C2C-QKD protocol refers to a protocol, such as BB84-QKD, decoy-QKD, and E91-QKD, that can connect a communication pair with only one optical fiber. In contrast, the C2C-QKD protocol requires the participation of an untrusted third party (UTP), meanwhile, both of the two communication parties should connect to the UTP through one optical fiber. MDI-QKD, CV-MDI-QKD, and TF-QKD are all representatives of this kind. For demonstration purposes, we define the two communication parties of a C2C-QKD device as two C2C-clients and label the quantum channel connecting two C2C-clients as a C2C-edge. Similarly, the two communication parties of a C2C-QKD device are defined as two CSC-clients, the UTP is called a CSC-server, and the two quantum channels connecting CSC-clients and CSCserver are labeled as two CSC-edge. In the context of a hybrid QKD network, each node may play one or more roles in a C2Cclient, a CSC-client or a CSC-server, and each edge (optical fiber) may contain one or more C2C-edges or CSC-edges.
Based on this classification, we design an analytical model, which is essentially an optimization formulation, to solve the problem of the optimal deployment of QKD devices and trustedrelays for the hybrid QKD network. We summarize the notations in Table 1 and make the following explanations.
The formulation takes following items as input: (i) We 
Ratio of key length to plaintext length in the adopted encryption algorithm
Key generation capability of a C2C-QKD device arranged on the CSCedge (u, p, v) 
Representing a set of non-negative communication demands as D s,t and key consumption ratios as β s,t , meanwhile specifying the requested key demand for each communication pair as (s, t) (s ∈ V, t ∈ V). In addition, β s,t represents the ratio of the key length to the plaintext length in the adopted encryption algorithm. In particular, when the value of β s,t is 1, it indicates that a One-Time-Pad (OTP) algorithm [11] is adopted to achieve secure communication. When the value of β s,t is 0, it indicates that the adopted encryption algorithm does not require quantum keys. (iii) for each C2C-QKD device arranged on the C2C-edge (u, v) ∈ E, the non-negative real-valued key generation capability is defined as R (u,v) , and for each CSC-QKD device arranged on the CSC-edge The complete formulation is then given by, minimize:
∀s ∈ V, ∀t ∈ V, ∑ p∈V,v∈V 
where
The objective function is expressed in Eq. (1), which minimizes the construction cost (consisting of the deployment cost of QKD devices and the credibility control cost of trusted-relays) by reusing existing optical fibers. Here, we use the price of a C2C-QKD device as the basis for cost calculation. Besides, the price of a CSC-QKD device is assumed to be q 1 times, and the credibility control cost of a trusted-relay be q 2 times.
Constraints Eqs. (2, 3) state the capacity constraint condition that the total key generation capability on an edge must be larger than the total flow amount through this edge. Constraints Eqs. (4, 5) express the flow conservation condition, i.e., the total flow amount enters a non-source-sink node must be equal to the total flow amount exits this node. Constraints Eqs. (6, 7, 8, 9, 10) prove that there are sufficient key materials exits the source node and enters the destination one to satisfy the key demand between the two nodes, where A s,t and A s,t represent the total flow amount of C2C-QKD devices and CSC-QKD devices respectively. Constraint Eq. (11) enforces the selection of trust-relays.
In this study, all other constraints are linear functions, except the Eq. (11) which is a piecewise function. To facilitate the solution, we transform the Eq. (11) into a linear expression by the means of approximation, making this formulation a standard mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model. More specifically, by introducing additional decision variables C (v) and C (v), the Eq. (11) is rewritten as Eqs. (12, 13, 14) , where M is an arbitrarily large real number.
The decision variables of this standard MILP formulation are listed below:
The size of this standard MILP formulation is dominated by the number of decision variables, which is upper bounded by |E| + E · |V| 2 + 1 + 3 |V| ≤ |V| 5 + |V| 4 + |V| 3 + |V| 2 + 3 |V|. As a typical MILP model, this formulation can be solved by a mature linear programming solver. After optimized by Gurobi, this programming solver is convenient to retrieve that how many QKD devices need to be installed on each edge (i.e., S (u,v) and S (u,p,v) ), which nodes need to be selected as trusted-relays (i.e., C (v)), and which paths are selected for each communication pair to route the encrypted messages (i.e., F s,t (u,v) and F s,t (u,p,v) ). We evaluate the results of our proposed analytical model on 10 families of random graphs, which are generated based on the ER model. The random graphs are set as follows: each family consists of 100 instances with a fixed number of nodes, an average probability 0.6 of connecting any two nodes, a set of edge lengths are uniformly distributed at [50, 200] km, and a uniform traffic matrix is established at [100, 500] kbps between two-thirds of nodes to give the remaining one-third of nodes a chance to act as untrusted-relays. In addition, we apply the decoy-QKD protocol [12] to prepare C2C-QKD devices, and the SNS-TF-QKD protocol [13] to prepare CSC-QKD devices. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the parameters of all C2C-QKD devices are the same, and the parameters of all CSC-QKD devices are also the same. It worth noting that the proposed analytical model supports the configuration of different parameter setting for each QKD device.
The main cost of a decoy-QKD device mainly comes from two single-photon detectors, similarly, the main cost of a SNS-TF-QKD device also mainly comes from that. Based on that, we assumed that q 1 = 1. However, considering the complex composition of the credibility control cost, it is usually realized by physical isolation [14] , so the value of q 2 is hard to determine. Therefore, we perform two simulations with different q 2 of 0.1 and 100, respectively.
Fig. 2.
Average minimum costs for the 10 families of random graphs. The blue curve denotes the minimum cost for pure-CSC networks consisting of CSC-QKD devices only; the green curve denotes the minimum cost for pure-C2C networks consisting of C2C-QKD devices only; the orange curve shows the minimum cost for hybrid networks which contains both CSC-QKD and C2C-QKD devices.
In Fig. 2 , we report the average value of the objective function, i.e. the minimum cost of hybrid networks, pure-C2C networks and pure-CSC networks versus the graph size. It can be seen from the figure that, by carefully deploying QKD devices and trusted-relays, significant savings can be achieved when use multiple types of QKD protocols: the data points of hybrid networks are always lower than that of the other two.
Although above results are sufficient to prove the universality of this study, another simulation based on a real NSFNET topology [4] is designed to further verify the effectiveness of the cost optimization model. Under the same assumptions, the cor- responding optimal deployment is shown in Table 2 . In the table, Num. C2C., Num. CSC., and Num. TR. indicate the total number of C2C-QKD devices, C2C-QKD devices and trusted-relays, respectively. It should be noted that, due to the irregularity of the NSFNET topology, the cost of networking under NSFNET topology is higher than that under random topology of a same scale.
In summary, we have proposed an analytical model to find the optimal deployment of multiple types of QKD devices and trusted-relays, and then to create a hybrid QKD network with existing or planned optical fibers at a minimum cost. Through simulation, we have proved that the optimal topology can be calculated using existing computing tools, such as Gurobi, with the help of the proposed model. In the process of research, the effectiveness and universality of this study have been verified. We hope that the model proposed in this paper could contribute a significance for researchers to promote the application of QKD technology in the security enhancement of classical communication networks.
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